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 INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the hotly debated issue of sustainability in Microfinance 
and how an uprising impacted the sustainability drive of a number of microfinance 
NGOs. It analyzes the dynamics of the different factors in achieving sustainability in 
Microfinance Institutions (or microfinance supplying NGOs) and the goal of helping 
the low-income households to get out of poverty. It touches on the conflict of opinion 
in the attempts of some key actors, the donors and the financial institutions (FIs), to re-
quire institutional and financial sustainability from Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) 
and the inevitable trade-off which tends to exclude the poorest and high-risk clients and 
to pass much of the risk to the poor. 
The research considers the theory of risk management in the symbiotic relation-
ship of achieving sustainability for Microfinance Institutions and the income-generating 
livelihood of poor clients. Both the clients and the MFIs face multiple risks, however, 
the paper mainly explores the impact of an exogenous risk, war in this case, on the sus-
tainability of a client’s livelihood on one hand and financial sustainability of an MFI on 
the other. The literature on sustainability has barely considered this. 
The study aims to contribute in the microfinance literature by exploring how an 
uprising in Southern Philippines, impacted the sustainability of microfinance entities 
and the livelihood of the poor in these war-torn areas. It also aims to provide insights 
on the dynamics of behavior of the key actors with regard to managing risks faced by 
the MFIs and the clients particularly in unforeseen crises. 
The empirical basis for the analyses is the case of three Microfinance Institu-
tions in the southern Philippines. Focus was on five clients from each of these MFIs 
that experienced (one MFI and its clients still experiencing effects at the time of the 
research) the political and armed uprising by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
against the Philippine government. This rebellion peaked in the year 2000. 
There are five basic realities that served as springboard for discussion on micro-
finance sustainability and risk management. 
First, in the macro picture, the financial markets witnessed a change of prefer-
ence to a market-oriented paradigm over directed credit and subsidized approach used 
by financial institutions, NGOs and governments of some developing economies. The 
market-oriented paradigm displayed a capacity to reach the poor, which the commercial 
lenders failed to serve. The commercial lenders failed to reach economic and social ob-
jectives, with regard to rural finance (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2000). The specialized de-
  1velopment financial institutions created to serve these targeted clients (ibid, 2000:1) 
were convinced that the poor could improve their lot if only they had access to financial 
services, especially if no collateral is required. 
Second, the popular movement of credit for the poor evolved as an effective in-
strument for poverty alleviation. Some pioneering work proved that the poor can pay 
market based loans but also can save (Ledgerwood, 1996a). They also showed that the 
undertaking could be profitable for financial intermediaries (Wright, 1997). The in-
creased in demand for financial services from the formerly considered “unbankable” 
sector and the profitability for financial providers, developed what was once purely mi-
crocredit into a diversified system that is now called microfinance. 
Third, over time, the big success of Microcredit (Evans, et al, 1999) in countries 
like Bangladesh, Bolivia and Indonesia, and the exemplary performance shown by 
some large MFIs (Grameen Bank, ASA, Banco Sol and Bank Rakyat Indonesia, etc.) 
led to the development of Microfinance as an industry by itself. In poverty alleviation 
program run by many national governments it was considered an effective tool in re-
ducing poverty (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997, Ledgerwood, 1999a, Wright 2000). 
With the evolution came new actors in the field of microfinance such as interna-
tional financial organizations like the World Bank, Asian Development Bank; commer-
cial banking institutions like CITI bank, Deutsche Bank and; and bilateral and multilat-
eral organizations like the USAID, UNDP among others. Each of these entities contrib-
uted in particular areas of interventions in the capital/fund aspect or in technical capa-
bility or the legal aspect of regulations. The entrance and active participation of these 
financial and other institutions resulted in the burgeoning of financial resources to scale 
up outreach. They also influenced the direction, quality and goals of microfinance mov-
ing beyond poverty alleviation to sustainability of MFIs. 
Fourth, risks inherent to microfinance earned attention and support from supply-
side organizations. Instruments were developed to address risks especially on credit 
risks. Certain risks, however, are yet to be covered by existing policies. The outbreak of 
war is one such risk that has received little attention. 
Fifth, after more than a decade of popularity of this market-based scheme, criti-
cisms started to grow. Emphasis was getting skewed towards sustainability of MFIs 
lowering the depth of outreach. The acclaimed high repayment of 95% to 100% of 
MFIs could be the result of passing the risks to the poor (e.g. the widely used group 
lending methods where the rest of the group members pay the default of a co-member). 
  2Accordingly, sustainability of MFIs may come at the cost of the sustainability of poor 
clients. 
Figure 1 provides the overall framework in looking at the different actors re-
sponsible for sustainability, focusing on the symbiotic relationship between the ability 
of clients to pay their loans and to save on one hand and on the other hand the MFIs 
outreach and profitability. The MFI’s capacity is greatly affected by the inflow of 
funds, technical assistance from the funding agencies, and the adequacy of regulatory 
environment provided by the government. Figure 2 (found in chapter 2) shows the risk 
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The paper is organized into three chapters. The first chapter situates the study. It 
examines how the present literature defines sustainability on the side of the MFI and on 
the other side of the client’s livelihood. It presents the growing imbalance in emphasis 
and assessment of sustainability, which tends to focus more on the MFIs at the expense 
of the depth of reach to the poor and the sustainability of their livelihood. 
  3The second chapter deals with the different levels of risk inherent to Microfi-
nance and the management of these risks to maximize returns and minimize costs of 
MFI, and the clients' capability to cope with economic stresses and “shocks” to sustain 
their livelihoods. A third diagram discusses the chain of risks among the different ac-
tors including the pressures for certain behavior of each of the actors. 
The third chapter presents case studies of three MFIs and fifteen of their clients. 
Baseline data outline their sustainability status before the war occurred. It presents the 
impact of war on: 1) the MFI level of sustainability as indicated in their financial ratios, 
and 2) the client sustainability in their capital, income, and default performance. It pre-
sents the post-war impact on two of these MFIs (the third MFI is still experiencing the 
stresses of war as of research time) and their clients. It also presents how MFIs and 
their clients acted to mitigate the risks and how the other actors played their role as 
well. 
The last section brings out the conclusion and policy implications. Primarily, 
the three MFIs have achieved depth in outreach and succeeded in assisting the clients in 
raising their incomes and building their assets. The occurrence of war, however, nega-
tively affected their sustainability in capital and activity. This negative impact has not 
been addressed by the other actors in the field. Empirical evidence revealed that most 
clients lost their capital for livelihood and were not able to resume after the crisis. Apart 
from one MFI’s policy of a brief loan moratorium and another MFI’s policy of amnesty 
for past dues, nothing substantial has been done to mitigate the impact of the crisis. 
On the positive side, there was a steady flow of fresh funds from funding insti-
tutions which allowed MFIs to continue expanding elsewhere to make up for the losses 
in their war-torn branch. This has enabled the MFIs to save their financial performance 
from deteriorating and to come out resilient.  In effect, war has not impacted the MFIs 
as severely as the clients. 
On the negative side, clients who lost their livelihood had paid the loans to the 
MFIs at all cost. The pressures, risks and losses were borne by the clients during and 
after the crisis. 
Significantly, other actors like the funding institutions, donors and the govern-
ment have not institutionalized policies or mitigating measures against the adverse im-
pact of war on the MFIs and clients. Their non-intervention according to PCFC, was 
because the war was not full scale and had not impacted negatively the financial ratios 
of the MFIs. However, the financial ratios of MFIs did not reflect the adverse effects of 
  4the war on clients. While revenues of MFIs depend on the repayment by clients, their 
geographic spread served to offset losses in the crisis-ridden area. This makes the hy-
pothesized symbiotic relationship in sustainability (figure 1) between the clients and 
MFIs not valid. 
If, however, the goal of the microfinance is reduction of poverty, inevitably, 
mitigating measures and policies have to be pro-active and form part of the risk man-
agement of the different actors to prevent a crisis from increasing clients’ vulnerability. 
These may include MFIs’ releasing of members’ savings during the crisis and refinanc-
ing or granting of fresh loans for them to re-start and recover their lost capital. The FIs 
may install risk-sharing scheme with the MFIs by rescheduling the latter’s repayments 
and releasing emergency funds to prevent liquidity problems. MFIs may devise a feed-
back mechanism to FIs so they know the intensity of the impact of any crisis to MFIs 
and their end-clients. The government may provide enabling environment to stimulate 
the local economy and pay compensation to victims of war. 
 
The research questions 
Using the framework in figure 1, the paper addresses the questions:  
1. What is the impact of an uprising on the operational and financial performance of 
Microfinance NGOs as reflected in the indicators for sustainability during and after the 
war? What is the level of vulnerability of MF-NGOs relative to their size, age, level of 
sustainability, and the support from existing donors and government policies? 
2. How did the conflict impact the livelihood of the clients and consequent paying and 
savings behavior? 
3. How did funding institutions, donors and government behave towards the affected 
Microfinance NGOs and their clients with regard to policies and interventions? 
 
Importance of the research 
The research results can be beneficial to MFIs and actors in the field in terms of 
practices, policies and regulations. Pro-active and comprehensive policies can provide 
forceful action during and after a crisis. The war in Mindanao, which started in 2000, is 
far from being resolved and the chances of recurrence are not remote. The war against 
terrorism is gaining momentum in the island. 
Since MFIs cannot just pullout from a crisis-beset area because it has to recover 
its  investments and since poverty alleviation is the raison d’être of microfinance, is far 




The MFIs and clients chosen for the case studies comply with the following cri-
teria: for the MFIs, that they are local NGOs with no international mother NGO; they 
have complied with the minimum standard for MFIs set by the Philippine Microfinance 
Council; and their performance has set them on the way to sustainability.
1
The three MFI in this research, each has a branch in the war-stricken munici-
palities of Kauswagan and Polomolok. Hagdan sa Pag-uswag Foundation and Milam-
dec Foundation operate in Kauswagan and South Cotabato Foundation operates in 
Polomolok. 
 The clients in this study were randomly selected from the list of pre-selected 
groups that maintained a minimum repayment rate of 85% and no observed relational 
problems with other members.
2 It was deemed important that only groups of good 
standing were included to single out the war’s impact. Each complied with the follow-
ing criteria: 1) the borrower was a woman, 2) residing in the rural and war-stricken 
area, 3) was/is affected by the war, 4) maintained good credit standing prior to war, and 
5) had loans and ongoing business for at least three months prior to the conflict. 
To measure the impact of war on the MFIs sustainability, the research gathered 
quantitative data on the MFI’s performance as indicated in their financial ratios a quar-
ter before the war, a quarter during the war and a quarter after the war. The financial 
ratios were based on the set of standards for NGOs in the Philippines, which include 
size of outreach, collection efficiency, portfolio quality, Operating Cost Ratio, Opera-
tional Self-sufficiency and Financial self-sufficiency (defined and discussed in chapter 
2, and in appendix A).  
The collection of primary data made use of an interview schedule constructed 
for the study to elicit institutional profile of the MFIs, baseline data prior to the war, 
                                                 
1 Minimum standards as stipulated in the NGO Microfinance Standard include: 1) track record: at least 
three consecutive years in managing and implementing a microfinance program, minimum of 500 clients 
and no adverse borrowing record for the past three years; 2) outreach: at least 75% of active clients have 
loans of Pesos 25,000 and below, and the institution must clearly express in its vision and mission state-
ments a distinct commitment to reach low-income clients; 3) internal control system: a written internal 
and/or audit manual, regular conduct of internal audit and annual conduct of external. 
2 A group is composed of 5 members/borrowers. Three or more groups comprise a Center. 
  6and experiences of interventions during and after the war from their partners (donors 
and funding institutions). The instrument also elicited data on the policies and assis-
tance that the MFI extended to support their clients during and after the war. 
Another interview schedule was used to gather data on client economic standing 
and livelihood prior to the conflict, and the impact of war to their livelihood with regard 
to the size of capital and income, default and coping strategies, in the quarter during 
and the quarter after the war. The qualitative data include interventions received from 
other actors in microfinance during and after the conflict. For South Cotabato Founda-
tion’s clients, who at the time of the research were still in the midst of war, the data 
covered only before and during the war. 
A brief questionnaire was sent to PCFC, a FI that lends to the three MFIs in the 
study, to find out their interventions addressed to the MFIs and the borrowers/clients.  
 
Background on the field site 
The MFIs in the study are located in Mindanao, southern Philippines. The Phil-
ippines is divided into three main regions: Luzon in the north, Visayas in the central 
part and Mindanao in the south. The Mindanao region is characterized by multi-ethnic 
groupings of the tribal people, the Muslims and the Christians. 
The political conflict in a number of areas in Mindanao has been ongoing for 
the last three decades. It dissipated when the Moro National Liberation Front’s (MNLF) 
cry for autonomy was granted through the creation of the Autonomous Region of Mus-
lim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1996. However, this resulted in a division among the Mus-
lims with the MILF separating from MNLF and  continuing to wage war against the 
Philippine government. 
In February 2000 a number of confrontations between the MILF and the AFP 
took place in the southern part of Mindano but erupted in Kauswagan in the northern 
part in March 2000 when MILF took control of the municipal hall (USAID Field Re-
port, 2000) and then spread to other provinces. As of research time, the conflict was 
still ongoing in Polomolok, South Cotabato. Accordingly, the war brought some 
600,000 internal refugees (Mercado, 2000) as residents evacuated to safer provinces. 
Polomolok, where the branch of South Cotabato Foundation is located, is a sec-
ond class municipality where the primary source of income is farming for 52% of the 
households. Over 16% of the total population of South Cotabato (690,728 persons) 
lives in Polomolok (National Statistics Office, 2002). Dole Philippines, occupying 
  7some 15,500 hectares planted to pineapple, generates 6,000 jobs growing, processing 
and exporting of fresh and canned pineapple (Polomolok briefer, 2000). Other products 
include corn and rice with 4,850 hectares in corn and 445 hectares in rice. Asparagus 
production is planted in 1,435 hectares contracted to Marsman- Drysdale, Agri-venture 
and Tropifresh; livestock and poultry occupy 80 hectares under contract growing 
schemes with RFM, Vitarich and Swift, leading food producer firms in the country. 
The municipality of Kauswagan (where both the Milamdec and the Hagdan sa 
Pag-uswag Foundation have branches) is 20 minutes from the industrial city of Iligan, 
where a number of industrial firms producing cement, flour, coconut oil, and others 
products are located. Kauswagan and the adjacent towns were called “cocolandia” be-
cause the majority of the land in the area is planted to coconut. 
 
Background on MFIs 
Milamdec was registered as private non-stock, non-profit non-governmental or-
ganization (NGO) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in March 
1991. In 1992, it launched its microcredit program for women using the group lending 
method. As of June 2002, membership had reached 10,334 women borrowers spread in 
11 branches with total loan outstanding of Pesos 28,464, 045 million and close to Pesos 
90 million in cumulative loan disbursements. It covered five provinces and two cities in 
northern Mindanao. Included among the provinces is Lanao del Norte. 
Hagdan sa Pag-uswag specialized in microcredit since January 1988 and is also 
registered with the SEC as private non-stock and non-profit NGO. It lends to both men 
and women from the poor sector and has individual and group lending programs. As of 
June 2002 total outreach is 9,775 in 6 branches with loan outstanding of Pesos 
16,979,868 Million. It operates in northern Mindanao including Lanao del Norte. 
SCFI, registered with SEC in 1983, is the oldest of the three NGOs. However, it 
only seriously implemented microfinance in 1999. As of April 2002, total outreach is 
3,015 with Pesos 4,587,227 total loan outstanding in 4 branches. It operates in the 
southern Mindanao. It lends to both men and women clients. 
 
 
  8The map of Mindanao 
 
Site of SCFI war-
affected branch that 
began in January, 
2001 
The site of HSPFI & 
Milamdec 
war-affected branch & 
where the war in 
March, 2000 erupted 
Source: Polyglott-Travelguide, Philippines 
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This chapter explores the concept of sustainability in Microfinance along with 
other concepts and factors crucial to reaching operational and financial sustainability of 
MFIs and the livelihood of the clients. It discusses the importance of improving the 
enabling environment for Philippine microfinance NGOs need to reach sustainability 
alongside the downward pressures and vulnerability of the clients. It touches on the un-
even pressures in the drive towards sustainability versus the depth of outreach of the 
MFI. It is greatly influenced by the organizations’ use of “best practices” and standards. 
 
1.1  Sustainability: Definition and implication 
The goals of microfinance include both the poverty alleviation and the sustain-
ability of microfinance institutions. Sustainability of MFIs is important in facilitating 
economic uplift of clients which requires repeat loans. Credit alone is insufficient. 
Equally crucial are other financial services such as savings and insurance. The clients 
have other needs, seasonality of income and vulnerability to various other risks and 
economic stresses (Chambers, 1995). 
Financial sustainability in microfinance is defined as a sustained performance 
where revenues from financial services are able to cover operational
3 and financial 
costs
4 (Ledgerwood, 1996:1).
 For Microfinance Institutions (MFI), sustainability refers 
to their ability to reach the goals of the present without sacrificing the ability to meet 
goals in the future (Schreiner, 2000:1, Khandker, et al, 1995:32). 
Other definitions of sustainability center on the financial self-sufficiency of 
MFIs. The justification, which the supply side organizations like the World Bank and 
international donors rally around, is to ensure access of enormous number of low-
income households to financial services over a long period. The Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poorest (CGAP), a committee set up by World Bank to coordinate bilateral 
and multilateral funds, regards it as a “win-win” proposition where market-based MFIs 
practice good banking principles and still fulfill the social goal of alleviating poverty 
(Morduch, 2000:617). Emphasis on financial sustainability of MFIs assures healthy re-
turns to the Financial Institutions (FIs) and commercial banks that invest in MFIs. This 
                                                 
3 operarional expenses are salaries, rent, transportation, utilities (Ledgerwood, 1996b:1) 
4 financial expenses include interest  paid on both concessional and commercial loans (Ledgerwood, 
1996b:1) 
  10is the essence of mainstreaming MFIs into the formal sector, which fits with the neo-
liberal paradigm. 
 
1.2  Institution building and regulatory framework 
In the race for sustainability, supply side organizations look at the different fac-
tors critical for sustainability of MFIs. This focus emphasized the institutional factors 
of governance, capability of managing large portfolio, management information system 
(MIS) and performing within the standards. With the challenge to scale up and meet 
increasing demand for financial services, this focus extends beyond the institution to-
wards a conducive environment that supports among other concerns , savings mobiliza-
tion, graduation of MFIs to the formal financial sector (Sharif, 1997:76) and govern-
ment intervention (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2000:19). 
Financial Institutions and donors have pledged billions of dollars to support 
worldwide scaling-up of microfinance (Morduch, 2000:617). At the same time there 
has been an observed dwindling of donor funds in some third world countries. MFIs 
have been able to draw donor funds during the past two decades. The main reason was 
that donors find the return on investment (ROI) in microfinance unbeatable (Wright, 
1996:5). The original funds have multiplier effects without further cost to the donors, 
while the prospect for sustainability of the programs is high (ibid). 
These funds addressed the lack of capital (Morshed, 2000; Tucker and 1997:27) 
and “the lack of institutional and human capacity to deliver financial services” (Tucker, 
1997:27) which hindered MFIs from reaching economies of scale essential for sustain-
ability. 
In the Philippines, the author was familiar with many small but serious MFIs 
that were ripe for a breakthrough if only some capability and institutional input could 
be provided. Recently, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), launched 
the MicroStart Program (MSP) globally which provided micro-grant and technical as-
sistance to MFIs with potential for sustainable growth and which complied with the do-
nors’ criteria. MSP was implemented in the Philippines in 1999 and provided technical 
assistance to 13 MFIs (including the two in this research) in collaboration with the As-
sociation for Social Advancement (ASA) of Bangladesh as the technical service pro-
vider. ASA has provided simple, standardized management structures and accounting 
systems that resulted in substantial reduction of cost for the MFI and their clients 
(Rutherford, 1995 as cited in Morduch, 2000). 
  11As a result, the aggregate outreach of 12,591 of the assisted MFIs prior to their 
entry to the MSP rose to 40,490 after two years and the aggregate loan disbursements 
rose from Pesos 43,699,617 Million to Pesos 403,568,500 Million (MSP report as of 
April 2002). Apart from the figures, the system allowed many participating MFI to 
reach viability in a short time. 
On the regulatory factor, the industry examined how supportive the existing in-
frastructure was, particularly with regard to savings mobilization and access to com-
mercial funds by MFIs to boost their loan portfolio, which in many cases were not 
enough from donors (Ledgerwood, 1996:20). The government can do a lot here in cre-
ating a conducive environment to support institutional development and in providing 
for an appropriate regulatory system (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2000:19). 
In many countries NGOs run microfinance without a legal charter to legitimize 
their financial intermediation (Christen and Rosenberg, 2002). The Philippine NGOs 
belong to the unregulated category. Cooperatives are under the Cooperative Develop-
ment Authority (CDA) while banks and non-banks are under the supervision and regu-
lation of the Philippine Central bank (BSP). Legally, only Cooperatives, Banks, and 
Savings and Loans Association (SLAs) are allowed to accept deposits from the public. 
Consequently, Microfinance NGOs collect savings from members only and are prohib-
ited to mobilize deposits from the community at large. The name “deposit” is not al-
lowed and so members’ savings are called by many different names other than “depos-
its” (Ledgerwood, 1996a:20). 
The Institutional Policy and Framework (IPF) defined by Quinones and Seibel 
(2000:195) as “sets of formal rules and norms that regulate public life in a society” is 
important. Accordingly, there are three possible levels of regulation, namely, the gov-
ernment regulation where MFIs are under the supervision of a bank superintendent as a 
first classification; the regulation through a network as a second classification, and the 
self-regulation of MFIs as a third classification. 
In the Philippines Microfinance Standards for NGOs established, endorsed and 
adapted the second-tier regulation in 1997. The standards focused on quantitative per-
formance of the MFIs especially the financial ratios and outreach discussed in chapter 3 
(see appendix A for detailed definition and rating). 
In addition, the Philippine government has given all out support for the devel-
opment of a policy framework and provides for market-oriented financial and credit 
policies. It requires market interest rates on loans and savings, removal of loan quotas, 
  12and earmarking of public funds for direct lending (National Credit Council, accessed 
June 29, 2000). Together with the Microfinance Standards for NGOs, these NCC direc-
tives serve as the regulatory framework in the absence of the other kinds of regulation. 
Importantly, the government created the Peoples’ Credit and Finance Corpora-
tion (PCFC), an Apex Financial Institution (AFI), in 1996 to cater to MFIs in their ca-
pacity building and capital needs (Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Circular, 2001), this has 
sped up the growth of the industry and the emphasis on sustainability. 
 
1.3 The  Trade-off 
The hype of sustainability among MFIs, however, has affected their depth of 
outreach in favor of scale of outreach (Rahman and Hossain, 1990; Wood and Shariff, 
1997; and Hulme and Mosley, 1997). There is the risk of the poorest getting excluded 
again (Hulme and Mosley, 1995 as cited in Sharif, 1997:72). 
Is this the downside of the market approach? The key proponents for the profit-
ability drive have been the commercial and international funding institutions. They 
turned and tuned the focus more and more on the viability and financial sustainability 
of MFIs. Added to this is CGAP’s “best practices” that highlight the tenet that only 
MFIs capable of running the program professionally can, in the end, achieve consider-
able scale of outreach and thereby reduce poverty” (Morduch, 2000: 617). Morduch 
argued, however, that the “best practices” while keen on crucial aspects of operation 
like “financial transparency, standardizing products, and achieving scale” and ensuring 
full-cost pricing of financial products to ensure viability, have missed the focus on the 
issue of “who is being served” by the MFIs (ibid: 618). 
Thys (2000) in his article Depth of outreach: incidental outcome or policy 
choice? cited Rosenberg (1996) who argued that “some organizations demonstrate that 
breadth is compatible with depth”. Banco Sol in Bolivia has 1,400 very poor in its 
60,000 total outreach (Thys, 2000:7). The problem is that the number of poor clients 
are dropping-off from the programs for failure to keep good credit standing (Sharif, 
1997:72). Thys argued that “depth of outreach need not be just a function of casting the 
net of existing financial services more widely and capturing a few very poor people in 
the process” but should be a conscious policy of the institutions (ibid). 
What fueled the race to sustainability is the pressure that MFIs need to stand on 
their own because funding will soon be pulled away even if they manifest deep social 
effectiveness (Morduch, 2000: 619). This assumed that anti-poverty programs must or 
  13should be self-sufficient (ibid). Abels argues, there should be other approaches that di-
verse from that of self-sufficiency  with some choosing to support MFIs reaching to the 
core poor and assistance is not “withheld by the profitability drive” (Abels, 2000:10). 
According to Morduch, that while it is true that poor households can repay 
commercial rate and above, yet, not all of them can. In fact, the majority from the more 
vulnerable group cannot (2000: 621). They argue that sustainable programs are those 
that reach the poor whose income is close to the poverty line while subsidized program 
are those that reach the 50 % bottom poor (ibid:). Thus, the seemingly more commer-
cial and less subsidized programs tend to reduce depth in outreach (ibid: 623). 
Inadvertently, the big “trade-off” of the self-sufficiency drive is the exclusion of 
the original target of the program: The hardcore poor. The primary concentration has 
become the more technical assessment and evaluation of microfinance and has rele-
gated the social end of fighting poverty as a secondary aim (Abels, 2000:3). “Concep-
tually, then, microfinance, was lifted out and became detached from the developmental 
context it originated from the larger parts of the world” (ibid) and apparently factors 
from the supply side facilitated this turn about (Sharif: 72). Is sustainability, therefore, a 
sweet or a bitter pill for MFIs and the low-income target of microfinance?  
 
1.4  Clients’ viability and vulnerability 
Chambers used sustainability to refer to “long term” and livelihood “to the 
many activities which make up a living” in other words, more stable sources of income. 
There seem to be two opposing views and experiences with regard to the outlook of 
sustainability in the poor clients’ livelihood. On the one hand, there is skepticism about 
sustainability of livelihood because of fungibility (Ellis, 1999a) like poor borrowers’ 
tendency to divert loans to consumption, and their vulnerability to a lot of situations 
like sickness, death, natural calamities, etc. (Hulme and Mosley as cited in Sharif, 
1997).
5 On the other hand, Chamber (1995) argued for sustainability of livelihood that 
“people may choose to eat less and worse to protect their livelihood assets in bad time 
to come” (Chambers, 1995:23). 
In the context of microfinance, it is possible that some borrowers are willing to 
sacrifice meeting family needs to ensure that their capital revolves and repayment is on 
time to maintain good credit standing and security of access to succeeding loans. 
  14Chamber (1995) referred this as “claims and access” which can be translated to mean 
an assurance of repeat loans in the future on which livelihood depends. 
This behavior is best understood considering that the poor client is subjected to 
all kinds of conditions that render them vulnerable. Hulme and Mosley defined vulner-
ability as the “dramatic decrease in consumption levels, ill-health and physical weak-
ness, social inferiority, powerlessness, humiliation and isolation” (Hulme and Mosley 
as cited in Sharif, 1997:99). The sudden experience of death of the breadwinner in the 
family, natural calamities that destroy crops and paralyze livelihood, and other obsta-
cles thwart any momentum towards economic mobility. 
Similarly, Rahman refers to these obstacles as “downward mobility pressures” 
that cause the cyclical mobility within the poverty line (as cited in Sharif, 1997:68). 
These include: 
1. Structural factors like slow growth of agricultural output. Seasonal problems of low 
demand for labor, products and services that are not reduced by the provision of finan-
cial services. Changes in the wider economy that affect credit and activities. 
2. Income erosion due to sickness-related expenditures, natural disasters like flood or 
droughts, and theft of assets. 
3. Life cycle changes such as the increase of number in the household, and death of an 
earning member. 
In effect the sustainability of household’s livelihoods is significantly affected by 
their vulnerability to downward pressures. Consequently, theseaffect their credit re-
payments and savings ability, which supports the claim of the camp that doubts the fea-
sibility that livelihood of the poor can reach sustainability. 
 
 
2  RISK-MANAGEMENT AND WAR 
This chapter provides the conceptual framework of the risks confronting the 
MFIs and the clients’ in a more normal situation and as well as the manner with which 
the inherent risks in microfinance are managed by using a wide-array of strategies to 
ensure sustainability. However, on top of the “normal” risks, the occurrence of unfore-
seen risk, war for example, affect the factors for achieving sustainability. Here the dif-
ferent actors may behave differently. Their behavior in managing the risk is largely de-
                                                                                                                                              
5 Diversion of funds from what it originally intends to, see more on Ellis, 1999: 160-161. 
  15termined by their location in the chain of risks and pressures confronting each one. The 
MFI and the FIs respond to the crisis with the end in view of protecting performance 
from sliding away from the goal of sustainability while the clients respond against be-
ing plunged to a more vulnerable condition. 
 
2.1  Risk management: Client level 
Poor borrowers across the different levels of poverty are vulnerable to a wide 
array of risks. Risks are “shocks” and “economic stress” that can force a household to 
shell out a considerable amount of money (Rutherford, 1999 as cited in Cohen and Seb-
stad, 1999:4). To add to the “downward mobility pressures” discussed in the earlier 
chapter, Cohen and Sebstad (ibid) categorized risks faced by clients into two types: 1) 
risks relative to the livelihood/enterprise and 2) risks relative to borrowing/taking a 
loan. 
Enterprise risks include lack of access to market information, competition, and 
labor practices. Loan-taking risks refer to capacity to repay the loans in full and the 
stress that goes with this uncertainty (ibid). 
The frequently occurring risks that beset the household, as in the Cohen and 
Sebstad study, are sickness, death and loss of the breadwinner. Secondary to these are 
those not related to the client intrinsic capability such as accidents, robberies and crime. 
While poor clients are vulnerable to shocks and economic stresses, they are not 
paralyzed and immobilized but developed a range of diverse and “complex strategies” 
(Chambers, 1995: 25). Accordingly, household may automatically reduce their con-
sumption; more members of the family seek labor opportunities and may resort to in-
formal borrowings from friends and relative to cope with “shocks” (ibid). 
Cohen and Sebstad argued that significant in dealing with “shocks” and stress is 
the poor household's partnership with a financial intermediary (1999:5). They further 
stressed that by taking more loans, poor clients are able to diversify their livelihood and 
along with it build their assets, which are useful when crisis strikes (ibid). 
This leads to an important discussion of client behavior which at present seem 
limited to their high demand of financial products, their repeat borrowing rate and re-
payment rate (ibid: 2).The authors suggested that the following should be considered as 
they have implications to client’s paying capacity, risk management, better cash flow 
and asset building: 
1.  How clients utilize and repay loans; 
  162.  What their economic goals are;  
3.  What are household dynamics in terms of economic resource management 
and activities; 
4.  How they deal with risks. 
Taking account of the points above can aid MFIs to be more effective in terms 
of providing relevant financial services that could facilitate improved MFI’s capacity to 
measure, manage and control financial risks. 
 
2.2  Risk management: MFI level 
Risk management became much talked about in the financial sector because of 
its implications on financial returns (Santomero, 1999:15). Risk management is the 
process by which responsible managers identify multiple key risks areas, choose which 
have to be responded and by what means, and establish procedures to monitor risk ar-
eas (Pyle, 1999:8). 
Regular banking considers various types of risks. Van Greuning and Bratanovic 
consider four categories of risks such as 1) Financial risk, 2) Operational risk, 3) Busi-
ness risk, 4) Event Risk (2000:3). Some, if not all, are applicable to Microfinance. 
The essence of risk-management is to minimize cost and to maximize return for 
the bank or the MFIs. It is crucial to consider risks because it is the inadequacy of risk 
management wherethe core of the problem of sustainability lies (Pyle, 1999:8). Also 
critical is to identify what in microfinance are the sources of risks. In doing so, appro-
priate instruments can be designed to address particular risks that may arise. 
It is also worthwhile to classify risks as those that are recurrent (flood, drought, 
fire, theft health-related) and those that do not occur often, like war, but can potentially 
harm not only the client, or the MFI but almost the entire community in many aspects 
such as economic, social, etc. 
For this particular research, the focus is made on credit risks where loan pay-
ments may be delayed or not paid and which can substantially and negatively affect the 
cash flow and liquidity of MFIs’ financial operation (van Greuning, et. al., 2000:125).
6 
In microfinance, the analysis and management of risks at the time of 1) Loan applica-
tion/pre-disbursement and 2) Post–loan disbursement are critical. 
                                                 
6 Defined “as the chance that a debtor will not be able to pay interest or repay the principal according to 
the terms specified in a crdit agreement” (Van Geuning et al., 2000: 125). 
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information about the client before granting the loan. Credit investigation is a common 
instrument where information on the client with regard to credit history, business abil-
ity and experience and her/his attitudes among others become critical input in determin-
ing amount and the approval of the loan. For repeat loan application, CARD Bank in 
the Philippines for instance, uses a formula to compute for the debt-paying capacity of 
the client. The client’s cash flow presents the aggregate income of the household and 
the total liabilities which helps determine the capability of the client to return the loan 
in full. Group guarantee of the Grameen method is perhaps the most used instrument 
apart from it being a substitute for collateral. Here, the endorsement of other members 
in the group serves as an affirmation that the applicant is credit worthy. Still others use 
savings to loan ratio in granting the next loan where savings at least comprise, say, 20% 
of the loan applied. 
While to a certain degree these instruments serve to fill the gap in the problem 
of asymmetry in information and, ultimately, high transaction cost for the MFI, these 
instruments are by no means flawless. The client in need of credit and other financial 
services tend to present herself fit for trust of the MFI and possibly hide information 
that can endanger their loan request. Connivance among peer group is not uncommon 
because the internal pressure to cooperate, so that all can receive their loans in turn is 
also high. 
As soon as the loan is already in the hands of the client, an MFI is faced with 
another set of risks. Fungibility or diversion of funds from its original intent is a com-
mon problem, along with the wide-ranging risks discussed earlier which potentially 
puts the loan at risk. 
In managing this other phase of risks some instruments have been developed. 
For instance, the Loan Utilization Check (LUC) is used after the loan disbursement by 
the Grameen Bank and its program replicators. LUC is conducted a week after the loan 
is released and the Loan Officer goes to the house of the borrower for an ocular inspec-
tion of the loan’s use. A follow-up check is further done on a regular basis as set by the 
MFI. Policies and instruments like these can encounter flaws. It is inevitable that bor-
rowers may choose to show something as proceeds of their loan during credit investiga-
tion to meet requirements of the MFI even though it is not. A spot check or unan-
nounced ocular visit by an officer of an MFI other than the regular field officer may be 
helpful. 
  18Useful tools are the financial ratios such as Portfolio at Risk (PAR) and the Re-
payment Rate (RR) provide measures of risks to the loan portfolio. PAR, should not be 
higher than 15% and RR should not go below 85% according the standards for Philip-
pine NGOs. An upward trend in PAR and downward trend in RR  should signal the 
MFI to do something. 
In cases of default due to vulnerability and risks (earlier discussed) among the 
very poor clients, a wide-array of practices have been adopted by MFIs which vary 
from light to severe application. 
Some literature describe ways of immediate action by MFIs such as freezing of 
defaulters’ savings and in the case of loans used to purchase equipment, the MFI with-
holds the ownership certificate of the item. Project Dungganon (PD) in the Philippines 
has a buffer fund called the “Alkansiya” Fund (meaning piggy bank) for members to 
resort to in cases of default. Some critics look at the buffer fund  negatively as it can 
encourage default. For this PD provided an incentive against possible misuse of the 
buffer fund: The more funds are left in the “Alkansiya” Fund by the end of the year, 
more funds can be returned to members at Christmas time. 
Each MFI has different strategies, policies and instruments developed to meas-
ure, manage and control risks as soon as repayment falls or  portfolio at risk rises, or 
sustainability ratios reach precarious level. All these are captured by the Performance 
Standards adapted in the Philippines. 
 
2.3  War, an unforeseeable risk 
As has been discussed, some exogenous risks have not been pro-actively cap-
tured by MFIs risk-management program. A sudden outbreak of war whether ethnic, 
religious or political in nature is one such risk. In this study, the empirical data can later 
describe how the MFIs and the clients dealt with the risk posed by war. 
War like flood or drought can devastate livelihood and cause disruptions of 
normal condition of people and livelihood for an uncertain length of time. War, is al-
most always unpredictable and difficult to evaluate in terms of adverse effects. This is 
in contrast to the seasonality and verifiability of flood or drought. With war there is dis-
location or immobilization of people. More importantly, war has wide-ranging impact 
and potential damage not only to the borrowers and MFIs but also to the wider social, 
economic and political environment. 
  19Figure 2 briefly illustrates the direct impact of war on both the clients and the 
MFIs. On the client side the war can immobilize their livelihood activities and can re-
sult in lower income that could translate to lower capacity for savings and loan repay-
ment. As this takes place, on the MFI side, the decreasing revenues can affect its profit-
ability and can stunt the growth of outreach. This illustrates a symbiotic relationship 
between the clients’ repayment and savings abilities and the MFIs capacity to expand 
and operate with profits, which ensure sustainability in the entire microfinance exer-
cise. 
War as a risk is not captured in the existing risk management in the industry and 
so no mitigating measures have been prepared. War for the different actors in microfi-
nance- the household, the MFI, the Funding Institutions can mean differently to each 
actor and the behavior of each may well differ. 
Microfinance in a crisis situation can be illustrated by the severe flood in 1998 
in Bangladesh. According to the General Manager of ASA, Enamul Haque (1998), five 
(5) million families related to microcredit program and 1,000 microcredit supplying 
NGOs were affected by the flood. The Credit Development Forum in its assessment 
estimated that 50% of these NGOs were harshly hit in their operation (Khan, 1998). In 
addition, an estimated Tk2000 million to Tk2500 million were needed to rehabilitate 
these NGOs (ibid). 
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In this crisis, there were two sources of interventions to mitigate the negative 
impact of the flood. One came from the NGOs and the other from an AFI, the PKSF. 
These interventions both addressed the NGOs and their borrowers. 
For instance, ASA (Haque, 1998) came up with and implemented the following 
policies without delay: 1) Refund of savings to members which amounted to Tk 220 
million; 2) Rescheduling of loans allowing the balances of the current loans of mem-
bers to be repaid at the end of the loan period tantamount to a moratorium of loans due; 
3) Refinancing for rehabilitation with Tk 1,000 to Tk 2,000 payable in one year for 
house repair, starting a new business; etc., 4) Granting of new loans for borrowers with 
only 1 to 5 Remaining installments left. 
Grameen Bank (Barua, 1998) came up with: 1) Immediate assistance program 
and 2) Post-flood rehabilitation program. The former include suspension of loan in-
stallments, distribution of water sanitation tablets, allowing members to withdraw the 
group fund savings (savings put in by members weekly as buffer fund in cases of im-
mediate needs) up to 100%, distribution of money from the “central welfare fund” with 
no interest, etc. The latter included the granting of seasonal loans for those who had 
paid 50% of their current loans, extension of loan payments of their current loans and 
granting of house repair loans, distribution of vegetable seeds and others. 
The other source of interventions were initiated by PKSF and addressed both to 
their partner organizations (POs) and their end borrowers. PKSF (Ahmed 2000) to-
  21gether with its POs declared a policy for a short-term moratorium of loan installments 
and rescheduling of the deferred payments after the loan period. In addition, it released 
Taka 1 crore (Tk Ten million) to POs for the purchase and distribution of life-saving 
drugs to members. 
The POs, had the option to apply for rescheduling of their loans due to PKSF in 
case they could not collect from their borrowers due to flood. In addition, when they 
had shortage of funds, they could apply for a loan for administrative funds to spend for 
salaries of field staff. 
More importantly, both the NGOs like GB and the PKSF went beyond outright 
assistance and rehabilitation policies and programs toward a more pro-active risk man-
agement measure through the establishment of the Disaster Management Fund (Khan, 
1998 & Ahmed, 2000) for the purpose of a more systemic rehabilitation of the flood 
affected POs and their borrowers. PKSF also innovated a microcredit insurance scheme 
and special funds to increase the crisis-coping capacity of the assetless and landless 
borrowers (Ahmed, 2000). 
Options that could be discussed with regard to the behavior of the three actors 
during the war are as follows: 1) Depending on the degree of war, the MFI may choose 
to put on hold regular activities or pull-out their services altogether; 2) The household 
may choose to continue her/his obligation to the MFI or may choose to drop out totally; 
3) The FIs may choose to continue funding, or withhold funds until certain stability can 
be perceived or may come up with policies and interventions to assist the MFIs and its 
clients. 
 
2.4 Risk  chain 
Figure 3 illustrates and explains the position or location of each of the three ac-
tors. The FI is the source of the funds and the beginning of the trail of risks and pres-
sures. As shown by the arrow, as the wholesale funds of FIs are lent to the MFIs, the 
risk with the pressures for its recovery are transferred heavily to the retailer. The trans-
action between the two is legally sanctioned. Then, as MFIs re-lend the funds to the 
client, the risk is now partly passed on to the clients but with no legal sanctions (in 
cases of collateral-free) and so the pressures are doubled to the MFIs. From the FIs, the 
pressure on the MFI is to return the loans with interests or risk a legal battle and the for-
feiture of future loans necessary to maintain demands from the clients and the sustain-
ability of the operation. From the clients, the pressure on MFI is to meet client demands 
  22on time. Without this clients may depart from the program. This would entail more 
costs to the MFIs in recruiting replacements and the risk of non-recovery of the loans. 
Aptly referred to as an intermediary institution, the MFI’s location is sand-
wiched between the source of the fund and the end-user of the fund and the terms differ 
particularly in the legality of the transaction and costs entailed. The implication of this 
intermediation with regard to risks and pressures tend to be heavy on this middle actor. 
The MFIs, being in between, could also be the channel of pressure from the FIs 
to the end-clients. As MFIs receive the pressure to become more efficient, cost-
effective and sustainable, subsequently, they may “squeeze” the clients to up-to-date in 
their repayment and/or “push” more loans to clients for bigger profits and to be more 
cost-effective. 
This positioning is also insightful in terms of who is in the best position to ex-
tend certain interventions such as information and funds when a strong crisis occurs 
and who may bear the impact of the crisis. This diagram is used later in the next chapter 
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  233  IMPACT OF WAR ON SUSTAINABILITY OF MFIS AND CLIENTS’ 
LIVELIHOOD 
This chapter presents the data gathered from three MFIs and fifteen of their cli-
ents. It describes and analyzes the economic and household profile of the clients and 
the MFIs in terms of the level of their sustainability before the crisis took place, and the 
impact of war. It also looks at the behavior of other actors in the field in terms of man-
aging the impact of war through policies and other interventions. 
This chapter highlights microfinance services which provide capital and help 
build the assets of the clients. War adversely affected whatever gains clients had from 
their livelihood. The majority of the clients lost their capital and income while those 
whose business survived, dramatically, decreased their income source and left them 
with the burden of paying their loans on top of meeting survival needs. They did not 
receive substantial interventions from MFIs or the FIs. MFIs limited their interventions 
to declaring moratorium on loan installments and foregoing penalties for late payments 
and outright relief to some victims. The FI considered the war  as “not in full scale” 
with no significant impact on the liquidity and portfolio quality of its partner MFIs, and 
hence, considered the crisis not enough to warrant intervention or to stop operations in 
the affected area. The goal of sustainability in microfinance was reduced, mainly, to the 
financial performance of the MFIs as indicated in their financial ratios. The crisis re-
verted the clients back to square one. They bore much of the risks, particularly, in re-
turning the loans critical to MFIs’ sustainability. 
 
3.1 Livelihood  and  economic  profile of the clients 
The data in table 1 present the sources of income of the households of the fif-
teen clients. The livelihood engagements of the households ranged (Hh, thereafter) 
from farm to non-farm like selling their labor to construction or copra farm, getting a 
chance to drive passenger vehicles (called “strike”) once or twice a week, working in 
other households in the capital, fishing and working in the smallest unit of local gov-
ernment called the “Barangay”. 
As was discussed in chapter 2, the data below confirmed what Chambers (1995) 
described as the wide-ranging livelihood activities of the poor households. 
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Livelihood activities/sources of income of the households 
TYPE OF LIVELIHOOD  FREQUENCY 
Farming 2 
Strike (occasional driving in jeepneys, tricycle, bus, etc)  4 
Local government official  4 






Domestic help  3 
 
In addition, the various sources of the Hh income point only to the inadequacy 
of one or two sources to meet Hh needs. Hh members needed to diversify their sources 
and pool together their incomes. This was typical of Hh below the poverty line. The Hh 
were not homogenous though. Data gathered on income, expenses, size of Hh and asset 
(table 2) indicated the location of the Hh in the poverty level and the size of the gap that 
the financial services of the MFIs were trying to fill. 
 
TABLE 2 
Economic profile of the 15 respondents/clients 
Client/R's no.  2a) 
Hh total number 
2b) 




Hh per capita  
weekly expenses 




001 5  140  205  12,350 
002 7  45  148  15,900 
003 3  210  350  15,000 
004 4  175  395  102,000 
005 8  25  131.25  5,000 
006 8  123  118.75  16,000 
007 7  165  164  32,100 
008 5  524  230  102,500 
009 7  82  64  27,000 
010 7  137  107  28,500 
011 5  170  120  65,000 
012 4  385  168  9,300 
013 5  200  230  73,500 
014 7  182  236  61,900 
015 7  328  314  33,500 
 
 
According to the National Statistics the daily cost of living allowance for a fam-
ily of six (outside Manila) as of April 2001 was Pesos 380 (National Wage Commission 
as cited in IBON facts and figures, 2002) and that many of the clients’ income fell be-
low that as shown in the weekly per capita income (table 2 column b, based on the past 
  25weeks income and some monthly income divided on a weekly basis). On a per capita 
basis 12 Hh out of 15 could not cover their per capita expenses. 
Asset size, which included home appliances, the cost of the house, livestock that 
they had and other properties, yielded an average of Pesos 39,970. Milamdec, in par-
ticular, stipulated (in its manual of operation) Pesos 50,000 as cut-off to qualify clients 
to the program. This meant that to be included in the definition of the poor households 
asset size was Pesos 50,000 and below. 
Three clients having assets above the poverty line (Respondents 11, 13 and 14) 
could be explained by the amount (table 3) and number of loans availed (table 4) by 
these clients. These could have contributed to build up their assets. 
Average asset size of SCFI clients (the first five) is Pesos 28,000 and is much 
lower than that of the other Hh of the older MFIs with the exception of R 04 with over 
Pesos 102,000 in asset because of a motorcycle for hire as income-generator of the Hh. 
Since per capita income of all the SCFI Hh could not cover their expenses (Table 2 col-
umn b vs. column c), did this mean that SCFI’ targeted poorer clients than the older 
MFIs? Other data may offer explanations with regard to this. 
TABLE 3 
Total loans received by the clients 
Respondent  
number 


















It is possible that the asset size of most of the older MFIs clients can be a func-
tion of the total amount of loans availed. The average for Milamdec clients is Pesos 
9,000 (R011 to 15) and HSPFIs’ Pesos 8,000 (R06 to 010) compared to SCFIs, Pesos 
4,000 (R01 to 05). This is 44% and 50% lower than the Hh of the older MFIs. In addi-
tion, membership profile in table 4 may explain that most of the SCFI’s clients had only 
  26two repeat loans so far compared to Milamdec’s average of 3.5 repeat loans and Hag-
dan’s 4.5 times. 
In addition, asset size maybe a function of clients' capacity to roll over their 
capital. For SCFI clients, if their income can hardly cover the expenses, the likelihood 
if rolling over their capital maybe lower than the clients of the older MFIs. In these two 
MFIs the clients’ income  could cover Hh expenses and even provide a surplus. This 




Length of membership  No. of loan cycles 
Years HSPFI  Milamdec SCFI Cycles HSPFI Milamdec SCFI 
0 ≤ 2      5  1 - 2      4 
2 ≤ 3  1  5    3 - 4  3  5  1 
3 ≤ 4  1      5 - 6  2     
4 ≤ 5  1      7 - 8       
5 ≤ 6  1    9  -10      
6 ≤ 7  1    11  -12      
 
 
In sum, the economic profile of the Hh could affirm the potential of microfi-
nance to reduce poverty in two ways: 1) Providing livelihood opportunities for new cli-
ents through loans and other financial services, and 2) Building assets of poor Hh as in 
the case of clients from the older MFIs. 
 
3.2  Clients’ comparative economic and livelihood profile before, during and 
after the war 
To see the impact of an unforeseen occurrence like war, on clients’ livelihood 
and income, and also see the behavior of clients in terms of managing and coping with 
the conflict, the following tables and graphs are insightful. 
Data in graph 1 show the decline of Milamdec’s clients’ capital size. From be-
fore to during the conflict their capital dropped by as much as 40% and further dropped 
by 30% from during to after the war. The reasons for the loss of capital include: Inabil-
ity to open the stores for fear of another hostage-taking; immobility from fear of being 
caught in the crossfire and from fear of  the rebels breaking into their homes for food; 
erratic conduct of business; and fear of the evacuation at night time. This immobility in 
livelihood activities caused them to consume the content of their stores and to use up 
  27their capital mainly for food. In terms of cash flow, money was flowing out and nothing 
was flowing in. After the war, client 5 was able to recover immediately because she 
took advantage of the military camp near her place and went to sell food and snacks to 
the soldiers thus increasing her income and capital. 
 
GRAPH 1    GRAPH 2 
Milamdec clients’ capital for ivelihood 
before, during and after the war 
  Weekly income of Milamdec’s clients 


























































































As their capital declined, so did their incomes as shown in table 2. 
Occasional and erratic conduct of business caused the decline in income for 
the majority. Some diversified their livelihood (see table 5) while others con-




Type of livelihood of Milamdec borrowers 
 PRE-WAR  WAR  PERIOD  POST-WAR 
RsN   type of business  type of business  type of business 









012 pig  fattening 
goat fattening 
variety store 
stop variety  store 
goat fattening 
013  variety store  variety store  variety store 
014  variety store  variety store  variety store 
015  snack vending  food vending  food & snack vend-
ing 
* only Pesos 4,000 from loans, the rest owned capital.   **  only Pesos 2,000 from the loan 
  28Those with more capital had enough to re-start their businesses after the war and ap-
peared to be more resilient. Those with smaller-sized businesses either lost them com-
pletely or struggled to keep them. 
With HSPFI, graph 3 reveals that only two clients were able to resume business 
with considerable capital after the war. The rest completely lost their capital during the 
crisis. Again, reasons vary from immobility from fear of loss of their lives and the di-
version of capital to consumption when nobody in the family earned a cent. Conse-
quently, incomes dropped for some (graph 4) while others were reduced to no income. 
Meanwhile table 7 shows that clients engaged in fish vending are more resilient than 
those with small stores. Although one with a bigger capital on fish vending before the 




HSPFI clients' capital for livelihood before, during and after the war 

























































HSPFI Clients' weekly income before, during and after the war 






































  29TABLE 6 
Type of livelihood of HSPFI borrowers 







06 snack  vending  stop  none 
07 variety  store  stop  none 
08  fish vending  none  fish vending 
09  fish vending  none  fish vending 
010 fish  vending  none  none 
 
 
The same can be observed among SCFI’s clients’ capital and income behavior 
(graphs 5 and 6) where the majority lost their capital during the crisis and most have 
not recovered after the war. One notably increased her capital, she took advantage of 
the convergence of people in her location, which increased her customers and eventu-
ally her income. three of the clients had no income at all as soon as the crisis began 
since their livelihood, variety store, depended on immediate neighbors as customers as 
shown in table 7. 
 
GRAPH 5  
SCFI’s clients capital for livelihood before, during and after the war 
 
 
Overall, 7 out of 15 clients lost their livelihood due to the war. For Milamdec 
clients, those who managed to resume their livelihood lost up to 84% of their capital. 
Apart from losing their capital, the clients found themselves incapable of paying their 
regular loans, and this brings up the issue of default which has implications on the 
MFIs’ sustainability. 
 
  30GRAPH 6 
SCFI Clients’ income before, during and after the war 



































Type of Livelihood of SCFI Borrowers 
 
Type of business  Rs no. 
Pre-war War  period 
01  Variety store  Variety store 
02  Variety store  Variety store 
03 Variety  store  None 
04  Dried fish vending  None 
 
 
3.3  Dynamics of risk management, sustainability and interventions among 
actors 
In understanding how clients behaved and coped with the impact of the crisis, 
tables 8, 9 and 10 highlight clients’ repayment behavior and their coping strategies. 
SCFI clients incurred only 1 to 2 weeks of default before the war, which is tol-
erable for MFIs. These increased to 8 to 15 weeks default during the war (table 8). Al-
most the same was true for HSPFI (table 9). This posed a problem to the branch’s col-
lection rate. This can be verified later in the discussion on the war’s impact on the fi-
nancial performance of the MFIs. 
The reasons for default, before the war, are insightful in giving a clear picture 
on how the poor cope. When short of cash they divert proceeds from the livelihood to 
respond to pressing school needs and failure to collect sales from a customer. 
  31TABLE 8 
SCFI Members profile of repayment and coping strategies before and during the war 
Period  % of mem-
bers with de-
fault 
No. of weeks 
of default 
Reasons of default  Coping strategies to pay 
the default 
Pre-war  60%  
(3 out of five) 
1 to 2 weeks  •  Income diverted to 
school needs of a 
child 
•  Unable to collect 
payment from a cus-
tomer 
•  Paid with the money 
from a daughter 
working in the capi-
tal as domestic help 
•  Paid with the money 
from a son working 
in the construction  
During war  60%  
(3 out of five) 
8 to 15 weeks  •  Money diverted to 
pay the hospitaliza-
tion of a child 
•  Diverted to consump-
tion since it was im-
possible to go out of 
the house 
•  To be paid after the 
harvest 
• Amortized  slowly 
from 
proceed of the store 




The worst situation is when another crisis comes on top of an existing crisis like 
hospitalization of a child during war (table 8). This case demonstrates a compounded 
pressure and what Rahman, as cited in Sharif (1997), referred to as “downward mobil-
ity pressures”. This places the client in a severe financial difficulty and risk as far as the 
loan payment is concerned. 
The three tables explained the causes of default during the war. Foremost, de-
fault is caused by limited mobility from fear of getting caught in the crossfire or discon-
tinuity of livelihood activities due to nightly evacuation and temporary dislocation. In 
addition, collection activities were disrupted. Consequently, funds were diverted to 
consumption, which could hurt both the livelihood and the maintenance of good track 
record essential for availment of future loans. This put the clients in an even more 
vulnerable situation. 
For Milamdec clients, non-payment was an MFI-initiated policy of declaring 
moratorium on loan payments for three weeks immediately after the war broke out and 
when evacuation happened. This saved them from incurring a “bad record” to the MFI. 
Loans are loans and they are to be repaid if the MFI has to survive and the client 
is to avail of the next loans. How did clients manage the economic stresses and 
“shocks” (Chambers, 1995) posed by the war? The last columns of tables 8 to 10 are 
insightful with regard to the coping strategies of the clients that range from short term 
to long-term solutions. 
  32TABLE 9 
HSPFI Members profile of repayment and coping strategies 
before, during and after the war 
 
Period  % of mem-
bers with 
default 
No. of weeks 
of default 
Reasons of default  Coping strategies to pay the 
default 
Pre-war None        
During war  80 %  4 to 12 weels  • No  collection 
done 
• Diverted  to 
consumption  
•  Evacuated and 
husband 
stopped work-
ing because of 
war 
•  when the collector 
comes we paid  
•  nothing as it was dan-
gerous to move out of 
the house  
•  allowance from a child 
working in the capital 
city 
Post-war  40 %  8 to 15 weeks  •  unable to re-
cover after the 
war 
•  no collector in 
the area since 
the war oc-
curred 
•  when collection re-
sumed in the area 
•  *paid in  March 2001 
when a child earned 
from selling labor in 
copra farm and daugh-




The short-term and most common strategy was to pay the loans due with remit-
tances received from daughters working as domestic help in the capital city or sons 
working in the construction. A slightly medium-term coping strategy is to pay the de-
fault, gradually, from the proceeds of whatever capital survived the war and invested in 
livelihood anew. In the case of non-collection by the MFI, for reasons not answered 
when clarification was requested from the MFI, clients waited for the collector to return 
to settle the unpaid dues. However, if the clients had money to pay and were after of 
keeping the good record, they could have brought their payments to the nearest MFI 
office. 
The behavior of the repayment and continuity of their livelihood suggested that 
MFI clients were more resilient than the others in managing the crisis. Clients’ capacity 
varied. This could be attributed to a number of factors. One, those with bigger asset and 
capital prior to the crisis were able to keep the business going during and after the crisis 
even as their capital was decreasing. Two, those who diversified their livelihood had 
more to fall back on than those who only had one type of income and or had a station-
ary business like a variety store. In addition, those with family members engaged in 
  33non-farm or out of town income generating activities or received remittances exoge-
nously had an advantage more than those that relied on local sources. 
 
TABLE 10 
Milamdec members profile of repayment and coping strategies 
before, during and after the war 
Period  % of members 
with default 




Coping strategies to pay the 
default 
Pre-war None       
During war  100%  3 weeks  • availed  of 
the moratorium 
of loan payment 
policy of the MFI 
•  double the efforts by sell-
ing food and snacks near 
the military camp 
• childeren  work  in  the 
copra farm and help pay 
the default 
•  pension received by the 
daughter 
Post-war None       
 
 
Three, there was absence of any policy to mitigate the negative effect of the cri-
sis especially for those who lost their capital entirely. There was no help, like what 
Bangladeshi’s MFIs and FI did by granting of fresh loans to recover lost capital and re-



























None     None     
Security through 
the presence of the 
government military 











Without appropriate interventions, the post-war economic situations of most of 
the clients seemed to have come back to square one but also could be worse with the 
burden of debt. Let us take the case of SCFI client with compounded problem of hospi-
  34talization of a child together with the loss of capital in war time. She found herself in a 
condition where she had to deal with 1) daily household needs to survive, 2) hospitali-
zation bills that can lead to indebtedness, 3) the burden of paying the past dues and all 
the pressures that went with the failure to keep the “ loan contract”, 4) the risk of not 
being able to renew credit due to bad repayment record, 5) pressures from group mates 
to keep a good record, and 6) the psychological feeling of shame to the larger commu-
nity for being a defaulter. Some of these conditions still prevail since this client had no 
means to pay the loans and looked to the approaching harvest from the farm to pay her 
arrears (overdue payment). 
Those who are able to pay their arrears actually paid them by sharing the burden 
with income-earning family members. While the payment of the arrears compete with 
meeting family needs, full repayment of previous loans put pressure on her as a neces-
sity to provide for repeat borrowings. This is an incentive to most of the borrowers to 
update payments. 
There may be cases, where the arrears were paid by other members in a group 
(in this case there are 5 members for Grameen method and 20 for ASA method) after 
some external pressures exerted by the MFI. Pressures may originate internally since 
loans are collateral-free and in lieu of collateral co-members are bound to pay in case of 
default. This can be enforced because future loan sizes and availment of any member in 
the group depends on the group’s good record, a built-in risk mitigating measure in the 
group method of lending. 
In this regard, risks are passed on to the members of the group. Risks are also 
passed on to the other members of the family who may have to pay the installments. 
While microfinance services may make a positive impact on the livelihood and asset 
building of the clients during normal times, the sudden occurrence of “downward pres-
sures” or war, can overturn the benefits from the program and render the clients vulner-
able to face the risks inherent in taking loans. This also points out to the negative side 
of collateral-free loans because the burden is now spread among the poor clients. 
How did the risk-sharing take place among FIs, MFIs and clients? Analyzing 
the behavior of the MFIs operation in different periods can be helpful to see how the 
behavior of clients’ repayment and savings during and after the war, have affected MFI 
profitability and outreach (defined in the Microfinance Standards as the active clients of 
a MFI with an existing loan or savings), critical for achieving sustainability (illustrated 
in figure 1). 
  35First, looking at the collection efficiency, graph 7 depicts the repayment behav-
ior of the clients, reflected in terms of repayment rate (RR) of MFIs. RR is extremely 
important since revenues to cover operational and financial costs of MFIs depend 
largely on their capacity to collect interests from clients’ loans. The discussion on credit 
risk in chapter 2 and how a MFI manages the pre and post disbursement risks is, even-
tually, measured in MFIs collection efficiency through the repayment rate. Low repay-
ment rates pose risks not only to viability but also to the future sustainability of MFIs.  
 
GRAPH 7 
Branch & institutional repayment rate per MFI 









































































Milamdec’s repayment rate has declined both in the branch and the overall 
(graph 7). A big drop happened when war occurred in the branch. This decline resulted 
from a branch-wide 3-week moratorium on loan payments policy implemented imme-
diately after the war began and from later defaults by more clients in the succeeding 
months. Since one fifth of the total outreach of Milamdec belonged to the affected 
branch, the institutional repayment rate decreased along with the branch’s. The decline 
extended over a quarter after the war. This behavior of repayment demonstrates the 
risk-sharing of the MFI with the occurrence of the crisis especially if a policy like 
moratorium on loan payments is made. This is a situation that calls for intervention be-
yond the MFI if the condition lingers. However, this impact can further be verified 
along with the behavior of other financial ratios in the standards as discussed later. 
  36Unlike Milamdec, war has less impact to HSPFI’s repayment (graph 8) with its 
steady rise in RR. While Iligan branch was affected by the war, yet, only 7.6% of its 
members were directly hit by the crisis and this accounted for less than 1% of HSPFI’s 















































Polomolok branch of SCFI showed a decline in repayment although as only 
3.1% of its members were affected by the war (graph 9). Its institutional RR declined 
even though less than 1% of its total outreach was affected. What explains this differ-
ence in RR with HSPFI when the number of default incurred by members during the 
war were almost the same for both MFIs as shown in tables 8 and 9? It is either in the 
amount of installments in arrears among the number of clients hit by the war or their 
repayment started to decrease in SCFI caused by other factors apart from the war.  
Second, the logical move for MFIs faced with a branch in crisis would be to 
make up for whatever losses it incurred by expanding in areas within the branch or in 
other branches with less or no conflict. This is apart from the primary pressure exerted 
on MFIs in terms of increasing outreach in order to increase revenues/profitability as a 
factor to achieve sustainability. 
Precisely, this is what the three MFIs have done in order to manage the crisis 
and the risk posed to their sustainability. All branches, except the Lanao branch with a 
slight decrease, increased their outreach even during the war. By recruiting new clients, 
MFIs increased loan volumes by disbursing new loans. New loans, normally, maintain 
  37100% repayment  because amortizations are small and new loanees exert effort to es-
tablish a good record with the MFIs.  In effect, war could hurt collections from the old 





Outreach of a new MFI 



























Outreach is critical in that all financial ratios depend on the number of clients. 
Microfinance standards gave it a sub-weight of 30% in the over-all rating (see appendix 
A). Logically, the race to scaling up outreach is not to reach more poor clients but 
mainly as a factor to hasten viability and, ultimately, sustainability for MFIs.  
Scaling up would entail steady in-flow of fresh and external funds, and the be-
havior of outreach of the three MFIs suggests that supply of funds from donors or FIs 
was not affected by the war.  
Third, supply-side organizations would certainly look at the financial perform-
ance and viability of MFIs before processing more loan requests. There are three sus-
tainability ratios crucial to ensure MFIs’ long term financial delivery to their clients and 
are measured by the microfinance standards (see appendix A) in terms of Operational 
Cost Ratio (OCR), Operating Self-sufficiency (OSS) and Financial Self-sufficiency 
(FSS). The OCR “shows how much the institution must spend on all operating costs to 
keep a peso loaned out at any given time” (Performance Standards, 1998: 10). This ra-
tio measures the productivity level of each of the staff as indicated by staff to borrower 
ratio (ibid: 10). The OSS measures the institution’s capacity to “sufficiently cover op-
erating costs over-time” (ibid: 11) making revenues from operations crucial to assure 
the FIs that their funds are not being consumed by MFIs’ operational expenses. The 
  38FSS measures the institution's capacity to cover all operating, financial and loan loss 
and to maintain the value of an MFI’s equity taking into account inflation and opportu-
nity loss. (ibid). 
Tables 12 to 14 are helpful in examining the level of viability and profitability 
of MFIs inclusive of the time of war and explain why supply of funds could have con-
tinued. 
HSPFI’s branch and institutional expenses (table 12) at different periods were 
over 70% covered by the income which meets the standard for Operating Self–
Sufficiency expected by funding institutions in the Philippines (see appendix A pages 
10 to 11 for the Rating System). Although the figures decreased during and after the 
war they still complied with the 70% minimum requirement by the standards. This was 




Operational and financial viability of HSPFI 
% of expenses covered by income  Period 
Iligan branch  Overall 
Pre-war 81  80 
War 77  73 
Post -war  72  73 
     
Source: Quarterly F/S of HSPFI: Jan. 2000 to September 2000 
 
 
Milamdec, which was more affected by the crisis in terms of repayment and 
branch outreach during the war, maintained a strong performance with 100% of the ex-
penses covered by income and profits. Obviously, both branch and institutional figures 
went lower during war but were able to get back after the war. This illustrates the posi-
tive impact on operations of bigger outreach even as repayment may temporarily de-
cline. A display of profits by MFI could very well attract investments (Rosenberg, 1994 






Operational and financial viability of Milamdec 
Period  % of expenses covered by income 
  39 Lanao  branch  Overall 
Pre-war 126  134 
War 104  101 
Post -war  110  114 
     
Source: Quarterly F/S of Milamdec: Dec. 1999 to August 2000. 
 
 
 It is interesting to note that a newer branch and a younger SCFI managed to 
display profits even as the war was going on (tables 14 and 15). What could explain the 
capacity of a newer MFI to show resilience over a crisis may be its scale of outreach 
and recovery rate apart from the fact that only 3 % were badly affected by the war. This 




Net profit of Polomolok branch 
War period  Net Profit (in Pesos) 
Mo 1  24,820 
Mo 2  59,214 





Viability of SCFI 
% of expenses covered by income 
Mo 1  150 
Mo 2  156 
Mo 3  155 
  
   
An equally important factor for sustainability for MFIs is clients’ savings.  As 
opposed to the expectation that savings collections of MFIs may decrease, table 16 pre-
sents the increasing amount of savings mobilized (savings mobilization means making 
use of clients’ savings to form part of the revolving fund for loans) by MFIs. 
 
TABLE 16 
Percentage of savings to loan outstanding 
Period  Lanao Branch  Milamdec  SCFI Overall  Iligan branch  HSPFI 
Pre-war  8  17  24 41 22 
War  10  20  25 41 21 
Post–war 13  31  27 32 21 
 
 
While HSPFI has been able to mobilize more savings due to its length of years 
of savings collection and bigger outreach their savings figure decreased. It is not clear 
whether the decrease was caused by the crisis. Milamdec’s Lanao branch slightly in-
creased in savings even though it had more clients caught by war than Iligan branch of 
  40HSPFI. Across MFIs, savings constituted more than one fourth of the institution’s loan 
portfolio. This is promising in terms of contribution to MFIs internal generation of 
funds, and important for sustainability. 
So far all the three MFIs proved to be resilient and managed the risk from the 
crisis by  increasing their outreach, savings mobilization and profitability. These kept 
them within the acceptable levels based on the standards. Compared to the clients’ 
plight for sustainability of livelihood, MFIs showed more flexibility to make up losses 
from the crisis because of wider geographic spread and mobility. Although MFIs have 
shared some risks with the clients as indicated in declaring moratorium of loan collec-
tions and amnesty of penalty in late payments yet the bigger risks and disadvantage 
were borne by the clients and their livelihood.  
With regard to intervention apart from MFI, PCFC, a common FI lender to the 
three MFIs, did not extend any assistance during or after the crisis. According to the 
present PCFC president and CEO (see appendix B for the electronic-mail), the crisis 
did not warrant intervention because for one, the war “was not full scale” and secondly, 
loan exposures of the three MFIs were not significantly affected with regard to liquidity 
and portfolio quality. In addition, had the MFIs requested for restructuring of their 
loans to PCFC or needed additional loans for liquidity, then PCFC could have granted 
them “provided that there are no material deterioration in their financial ratios” (ibid). 
While there were no interventions that came from PCFC, there were no restraints im-




  TABLE 18 
HSPFI sustainability ratios 
Period  Quarter  OCR  OSS  FSS 
Pre-war  Q 1  2 5 6 
War  Q 2  1 2 4 
Post-war  Q 3  1 2 1 







Iligan branch sustainability ratios 
 Period  Quarter  OCR  OSS  FSS 
Pre-war  Q 1  7 3 3 
War  Q 2  1 3 4 
Post-war  Q 3  1 2 1 
 
PCFC’s response seemed to be based on the behavior of the data on viability 
and profitability of the MFIs discussed earlier and on other indicators in the microfi-
nance standards. The following tables, for instance, present the other sustainability ra-
tios used by FIs, including PCFC (based on the experience of the researcher) in moni-
  41toring their conduits regularly. These ratios are seen as important for MFI to reach at 
least the minimum standard with an equivalent point score (EPS) of 1 and should dis-
play an increasing better performance over-time (the highest EPS is 7). Below are the 
behavior of the sustainability ratios of two of the MFIs (SCFI’s financial ratios were 
not available during data collection). 
Both the branch and the overall performance of HSPFI (tables 17 and 18) 
scored high in the standards before the war. All the three sustainability ratios showed 
some decline during the war and settled for the minimum scores after the war. How-
ever, while the performance declined, the scores were still within the acceptable level 
required by PCFC. The big decline of OCR during the war may be a result of increas-
ing personnel cost in the branch due to scaling up (as shown by the outreach) and not 








Table 19  
Lanao branch‘ sustainability ratios 
Period Quarter  OCR  OSS  FSS 
Pre-war Q  1  7  7  7 
War   Q 2  7  6  6 
Post-war Q  3  1  6  7 
     
Table 20  
Milamdec's sustainability ratios 
Period Quarter  OCR  OSS  FSS
Pre-war Q  1  7  7 7 
War   Q 2  7  6  6 
Post-war Q  3  1  6  7 
 
 
Milamdec’s strong viability discussed earlier was further confirmed in its OCR 
and FSS. Overall, the ratings were high even though there was a slight decrease in OSS 
and FSS in the Lanao branch. On the whole the data suggest that the branch and the in-
stitutional performance can withstand a crisis. The underlying factors for this perform-
ance could be the large volume of loan disbursements and loan outstanding of both 
branch and institution. Possibly, the profitability may have escaped the adverse impact 
of war because of profits from other branches. 
Should PCFC limit their assessment of the impact of the crisis only to the MFIs 
financial ratios then this is to consider only one side of the coin. The other side of the 
coin and what is not seen by the FI is the impact of war on the livelihood of the clients 
and how the badly affected ones managed to pay the arrears with the possible trade-off 
in the upkeep of the family and how members of the family (or possibly other group 
members) shared the risk and the burden of returning the loans. 
  42This may also be insightful in analyzing the limits of financial ratios in terms of 
assessing the impact of financial services to the poor. Is it legitimate a claim that mar-
ket-based credit has succeeded to help the poor as indicated in MFIs profitability and 
the poor’s bankability due to high repayment? How has the risk been managed and who 
bore much of the burden especially in a crisis situation like war? Is it legitimate for an 
MFI to reach sustainability at the cost of the sustainability of clients’ livelihood? 
In addition, should the acceptable performance of MFIs camouflage the real im-
pact of war on clients’ livelihood and obscure the need for interventions. Does this pass 
on the responsibility to the MFIs of extending interventions to the clients? How strate-
gic and reasonable are the positions of MFIs in doing this? Figure 3 in chapter 2 illus-
trates the location of the three actors in the flow of funds and the accompanying chain 
of risks in taking and recovering loans. It shows the difficult position of the MFI’ as 
intermediating institution between FIs and the clients. Apart from just being a little bet-
ter than a disbursing window to the FI, the MFIs in the study are likely to experience 
liquidity problem (defined in the standards as “the ability to meet demands for cash and 
current obligations as they become due”) should they decide to release the savings of 
the members or to grant fresh loans while deferring existing loan payment of the cli-
ents. 
What could have been the best for the MFIs to do, considering their location as 
go between the source of funds and the end-users? Should they have fedback to the FIs 
the negative impact of the crisis to the livelihood of the affected clients, the FIs may not 
be able to grasp the real situation in the areas affected by the crisis (unlike PKSF in 
Bangladesh that made an inquiry and an independent study on the impact of flood in 
1998 to conduits and their clients). MFIs may further request some interventions in 
terms of additional fund releases to increase coping capacity of clients against loss of 
capital and collapse of livelihood. According to the response of PCFC, it is willing to 
grant requests of MFIs under this situation should they made such requests. In the end 
this can still be attributed to the absence of policies that mitigate unforeseen risks and 
crisis in the industry. 
Finally, the absence of interventions to clients in crisis adversely affected their 
loan-funded projects and brought to naught whatever gains microfinance had started. 
This is a critical area for actors in the industry to look at and address to bring about real 
development. 
 
  43CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Evidence collected in this study yield to five major conclusions that provide in-
sights to the inquiries of this research, namely, the impact of war in Mindanao, Philip-
pines in year 2000 on the operational and financial sustainability of three MFIs and on 
the sustainability of livelihood of fifteen clients; how the other actors in the industry, 
the funding institutions and the government, behaved to mitigate the adverse impact of 
the crisis with respect to policies and interventions; and whether there is a symbiotic 
relationship in achieving sustainability between the MFIs and the client’s livelihood.  
First, Microfinance services of the three MFIs contributed to the increase in size 
of income, asset and capital of the fifteen clients in this study. However, comparing 
their income with the standard daily cost for a family of six set by the National Statis-
tics Office, theirs were well below standard although the per capita income of the ma-
jority of the households were able to cover their per capita daily expenses. Somehow, 
this is an indicator of a strong depth of outreach of the three MFIs in this study.  
Second, the impact of the war on the clients was strong. A number of clients 
were decapitalized and lost their loan-funded projects, and consequently lost their in-
come. While it did not come out from the list of the coping strategies of clients in the 
study, it is possible that some war-affected clients had been further decapitalized by 
disposing assets to pay off arrears and other debts incurred during the crisis. 
Third, MFIs financial and operational performance was well on the way to sus-
tainability prior to the crisis. A slight decreased in some financial and outreach indica-
tors took place during and after the war but overall the MFIs' (new and old) perform-
ance survived the crisis. 
Fourth, while both the clients and the MFIs faced risks during and after the up-
rising, they managed the risks through fall back strength and the flow of external re-
sources. MFIs fall back were their geographical spread to make up for losses from the 
war-torn branch and the steady in-flow of fresh funds form the funding institutions. 
Clients’ fall back (those who had) were remittances received from other members of 
the households working outside the conflict area and the receipt of funds like pension 
remittances. These accounted for the resilience against the crisis. However, clients that 
relied solely on local sources of income and loan-funded projects proved to be less re-
silient. Overall the clients’ economic level during and after the war rendered them more 
vulnerable because of the struggle to meet basic needs, the decrease of size of liveli-
hood and income, the obligation of paying the loan dues, the risk of losing the opportu-
  44nity for future loans in cases of incapacity to pay of the unpaid balances and the pres-
sures from the peer-group and the MFI to service the obligation. 
Fifth, apart from the relief extended immediately after the outbreak of war from 
MFIs and the government, and a short moratorium and amnesty for late payments from 
two MFIs, there was not much done for the rehabilitation and recovery of the lost capi-
tal and income of  the clients. The FI did not initiate any intervention because there was 
no request for such from the partner MFIs and the financial performance of the partners 
failed to show the negative impact of the crisis on the end-clients. It clearly illustrates 
that measuring the success of microfinance through technical assessment is not only 
unreliable but also calls for other methods in verifying the real impact of the financial 
services on helping the poor especially in crisis situation. 
 
While clients incurred defaults yet the repayment and other financial ratios of 
the MFIs were not badly affected. In effect the hypothesized symbiotic relationship be-
tween the two actors (figure 1) in achieving sustainability in microfinance is inconclu-
sive regardless of whether a small percentage or fully one fifth of an MFI’s clients have 
been affected by the crisis. 
Significantly and in sum, the empirical data and analyses suggest that, stand 
alone, microfinance services as a poverty alleviation tool may be effective only on 
normal and smooth conditions. An occurrence of forceful and unmitigated crisis 
whether social, economic or political in nature may cause the situation of the clients to 
revert to square one and even be worse off because of the risk and burden of debt. The 
MFIs withstood the crisis because they were only, partially, affected by the war but 
what if all of the MFIs branches or covered areas were caught in the crisis? 
In effect, policies are needed beyond the micro level along with an enabling en-
vironment to truly make microfinance services work for the poor clients. First, mecha-
nisms and crisis-mitigating policies have to be institutionalized in the legal documenta-
tion between the MFI and FI to permit a crisis to be captured and addressed with ap-
propriate policies to prevent adverse impact on either the clients or the MFIs. Particu-
larly, if the MFI  release the savings of the clients this will certainly put their liquidity 
at risk. 
The Bangladesh interventions discussed in chapter 2 appeared to have been ap-
propriate interventions like offering of fresh loans to re-start lost livelihood and re-
scheduling of existing loans to commence after the loan period. Either of the two rec-
  45ommendations would need assistance of the FIs where the funds are sourced and where 
the pressures for payments from MFI stem. As soon as the FI reschedules the loans due 
of the MFI, the latter can do the same to its end-clients as illustrated in figure 3. This 
appears to be top-down intervention. The author also recommends that end clients be 
consulted as to the type of intervention they deem appropriate for them. In Kauswagan, 
Milamdec offered to grant multi-purpose loans for the clients to manage the “shocks” 
and the economic stress at the time of crisis but they refused due to the uncertainty of 
the situation and the risk that the new loans may bring. Clients have agency (Sen, 1995) 
and are not just victims of poverty or of crisis. 
Second, the local government may forego taxation of small variety stores and 
fruit products brought for trading in the market. While it has not been ascertained in the 
two municipalities covered by the study but the author is familiar with the clients in the 
Gingo-og branch of Milamdec who get taxed for every load of fruit product brought to 
the market. While these client farmers want to escape from the exploitation by the mid-
dlemen by marketing their own products, they suffered from too much taxation. 
Third, a mandate from the national government for the development of special-
ized banks or FIs to allocate funds for speedy disbursements to war-affected clients 
through the conduits or partner MFIs would be helpful. In addition, it should stimulate 
the war-stricken local economies through a price support instrument. For instance, after 
the war in the 2
nd quarter in 2000, the coconut farmers in Kauswagan rested their hopes 
for recovery with the coming copra harvest. However, prices were very low. Price of 
copra at Pesos 3.00 (USD 0.06) a kilo when previously the price had been between Pe-
sos 8.00 (USD 0.16) and Pesos 12.000 (USD 0.24). The government could pay com-
pensation for the war-victims. This seemed to sound like it would require an enormous 
amount but considering the cost to the government of fighting with the MILF, this 
would not be impossible. 
Finally, the need for built-in risk-mitigating measures and policies in the micro-
finance systems may not only lower the transaction costs for all the actors in the indus-
try but, importantly, their (risk-mitigating measures and policies) existence may prevent 
the unforeseen and inevitable crisis from undermining the fulfillment of the goal of 
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October 16, 2002 
 
Ms. Rose Rivera 
Institute of Social Studies 
The Hague, Netherlands 
 
Dear Ms. Rivera: 
 
This has reference to your electronic mail of October 3, 2002 and your pro-
posed research on the impact of war on microfinance borrowers and on three of our 
partner NGOs in Southern Philippines. 
 
The war that broke out in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the middle of March 
2000 was not full scale and loan exposures of the three Microfinance Institutions you 
chose for your case studies, i.e. Milamdec, Hagdan sa Pag-Uswag and South Cotabato 
Foundation were not significant enough for their liquidity and loan portfolio quality   to 
be affected.  Hence no interventions were extended nor restraints imposed by PCFC 
on these MFIs in terms of financing livelihood activities of end clients in their areas of 
operations,. 
 
In practice, it is our conduits that decide on their policy about end borrowers 
affected by the dislocations, business cessations or losses due to armed conflicts in the 
area.   On the part of PCFC, we support the conduit partners in terms of restructuring 
their loan account, if requested, and even additional loan releases, if needed, provided 
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